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NOTES & COMMENTS
Exclusive Groove: How Modern
Substantial Similarity Law Invites
Attenuated Infringement Claims at the
Expense of Innovation and Sustainability
in the Music Industry
MARK KUIVILA*
As of 2015, the American entertainment market was
worth about $600 billion, and it is projected to substantially
exceed that figure in coming years.1 The global entertainment industry is worth about $2 trillion, meaning the U.S. is
responsible for over a quarter of total global entertainment
revenue.2 These statistics illustrate the staggering impact of
the American entertainment industry on the global markets
*
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1
The International Trade Administration projects that U.S. entertainment
and media markets will exceed $700 billion in total value by 2018. ANDREA
DASILVA, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., 2015 TOP MARKETS REPORT: MEDIA AND
ENTERTAINMENT 3 (2015), available at http://trade.gov/topmarkets/pdf/Media_
and_Entertainment_Top_Markets_Report.pdf. See also Paul Bond, Study: Global
Entertainment Industry Poised to Top $2 Trillion in 2016, BILLBOARD (June 5,
2013), http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/global/1565728/study-globalentertainment-industry-poised-to-top-2-trillion-in.
2
Bond, supra note 1. See DASILVA, supra note 1, at 6 (predicting that the
global entertainment and media industry will be worth $2.3 trillion by 2018).
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for film, television, and music. The American music industry
is particularly dominant in its global market, earning half of
world-wide sync revenues and accounting for nearly a third
of all global music revenue.3 Entertainment is clearly the
United States’ chief cultural export and has a profound effect on the country’s international image.
The figures above show the integral position of American media in the global market and the importance of studying and understanding the entertainment industries. Because of the country’s influential role in media, U.S. copyright law, as it pertains to these industries, has a significant
impact on the fundamental structures of both domestic and
international entertainment business.4 However, a large
portion of the common dialogue surrounding issues in U.S.
copyright law can be dominated by vague policy arguments
rather than more objective economic analysis. This article
seeks to blend the policy-based and empirical perspectives,
exploring the implications of U.S. copyright law on artistic
culture and creative industry itself as an economic system. It
will focus on the particularly fickle and confusing area of
“music law” and how the current framework is inapplicable
to modern music culture and destructive to the music industry as a whole.
Sync revenues are derived from “sync licenses” which allow the creator of
a visual work to use a piece of music as accompaniment for a fee. These licenses
cover compositions used in visual mediums including movies, TV shows, advertisements, and video games. See Christopher Shank, Music Synchs Galore, MUSIC
BUS. J. (Oct. 2013), http://www.thembj.org/2013/10/music-synchs-galore/. According to SelectUSA, “the U.S. has the world’s largest performance rights market and earns half of global sync revenues.” Media and Entertainment Spotlight:
The Media and Entertainment Industry in the United States, SELECTUSA, https://
www.selectusa.gov/media-entertainment-industry-united-states (last visited Sept.
24, 2016). For country by country divisions of global music revenue, see
RECORDING INDUS. ASS’N OF JAPAN, RIAJ YEARBOOK 2015, STATISTICS TRENDS:
THE RECORDING INDUSTRY IN JAPAN 24 (2015).
4
Copyright infringement disputes are governed by the law of the country in
which the copying took place. U.S. Copyright Office, International Copyright,
COPYRIGHT.GOV (Nov. 2009), http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fl100.html. Given
the lucrative potential of the U.S. entertainment markets, international entertainment entities seeking to maximize profit realization in the U.S. would have to
implement monetization strategies tailored to American copyright laws. See id.
3
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INTRODUCTION
In 2013, heirs to the Marvin Gaye estate accused popular musicians Pharrell Williams and Robin Thicke of copyright infringement, asserting that their song “Blurred Lines” was substantially
similar to the Marvin Gaye hit “Got to Give It Up.”5 After failing to

5
Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 1–2, Williams v. Bridgeport Music,
Inc., No. LA CV13–06004 JAK (AGRx), 2014 WL 7877773 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30,
2014), available at http://mcir.usc.edu/inplay/Documents/williamscomplaint.pdf.
For audio clips of the two songs, see Pharrell Williams, et al. v. Bridgeport Music,
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reach a settlement, Williams and Thicke sought declaratory judgment in federal court in the Central District of California, arguing
that the Gayes’ infringement claim was invalid.6 They asserted that
the plaintiffs’ interests in the underlying musical composition did
not protect the elements claimed to be similar—namely sound and
feel.7 In response, the Gayes filed a suit for copyright infringement.8
Despite wide support for the defense in the music community, Williams and Thicke were eventually found liable for infringement in
2015, and a unanimous jury awarded the plaintiffs $7.4 million in
damages and 50% of the song’s royalties—one the largest judgments in U.S. copyright history.9
Probably due to “Blurred Lines’” unexpected popularity in
2013,10 the litigation ignited a polarizing debate regarding the scope
of copyright in musical compositions. Popular musicians, industry
professionals, and legal academics alike weighed in on the issue––
many supporting Williams and Thicke.11 The music community was
et al., UNIV. S. CAL. MUSIC COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT RESOURCE, http://mcir.
usc.edu/inplay/Pages/williams.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2016).
6
Complaint, supra note 5, at 1–2.
7
Id. at 2.
8
Alan Duke, Marvin Gaye heirs sue ‘Blurred Lines’ artists, CNN (Nov. 1,
2013, 11:04 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/31/showbiz/blurred-lines-lawsuit/.
9
These damages were later reduced to $5.3 million, but the royalty interests
were upheld. Eriq Gardner, ‘Blurred Lines’ Lawsuit: Judge Rejects New Trial,
BILLBOARD (July 14, 2015), http://www.billboard.com/articles/news/6633554/bl
urred-lines-no-new-trial-pharrell-robin-thicke.
10
With “Blurred Lines,” Thicke achieved the rare feat of having a No. 1 Single and No. 1 Album on the Billboard Charts simultaneously. Keith Caulfield,
Robin Thicke’s Rare Double No. 1 Album, No. 1 Song, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER
(Aug. 9, 2013, 6:04 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/robin-thickes
-rare-double-no-603600.
11
See, e.g., Paul Schrodt, Why hundreds of musicians are supporting Pharrell and Robin Thicke in ‘Blurred Lines’ appeal, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 1, 2016,
12:09 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-more-than-200-musicians-support-blurred-lines-appeal-2016-8?r=UK&IR=T [hereinafter Schrodt, Hundreds of
Musicians] (Discussing that over 200 musicians signed an amicus brief on August
30, 2016 supporting Williams and Thicke’s appeal to the Ninth Circuit); Jody
Rosen, Questlove on Working With Elvis Costello, Miley’s Twerking, and His
Lunchtime DJ Sets, VULTURE (Sept. 18, 2013, 1:15 PM), http://www.
vulture.com/2013/09/questlove-on-his-new-album-with-elvis-costello.html (Expressing artist Questlove’s support for Williams and Thicke); Jordan Pearson, The
Clear Downside to the ‘Blurred Lines’ Verdict, MOTHERBOARD (March 11, 2015,
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particularly agitated by the possibility of what it saw as a permissible or even creatively necessary musical reference being categorized
as infringement.12 Additionally, many commentators believed the
suit set a dangerous precedent that might encourage a destructive
and already far too common practice in the music industry: commoditizing infringement litigation potential.13
Students and practitioners of patent law are likely familiar with
“patent trolls.” These entities own a diverse array of patents with no
intention of actually using them practically.14 Instead, they monetize
these holdings by licensing them to companies that need the technology and suing those parties that infringe them.15 Relatively recently, others began applying a similar strategy to music copyright
holdings; its practitioners are colloquially referred to as “sample
trolls.”16 These entities specialize in searching for and exploiting potential infringement claims against their rights-holdings, many times
10:23 AM), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-clear-downside-to-the-blurredlines-verdict (discussing a copyright activist’s viewpoint on the verdict); Paul
Schrodt, The $5 million ‘Blurred Lines’ legal fight over the song’s ‘vibe’ could
permanently change the music industry, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 15, 2015, 12:05
PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/blurred-lines-case-music-copyright-201512 [hereinafter Schrodt, Legal Fight] (discussing the possible consequences of the
ruling on the music industry).
12
Schrodt, Hundreds of Musicians, supra note 11. See, e.g., Mark Swed,
‘Blurred Lines’ verdict would rock Amadeus and other great composers, LA
TIMES (March 14, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/arts
/la-et-cm-blurred-lines-classical-notebook-20150314-column.html. Pearson, supra note 11.
13
Peter Kirn, Robin Thicke Judgment: The Day Copyright Law Died, Again,
CDM, (March 11, 2015), http://cdm.link/2015/03/robin-thicke-judgment-daycopyright-law-died/; Sherwin Siy, On “Blurred Lines,” Copyright Infringement,
and “Sample Trolls”, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE (Aug. 20, 2013), https://www.publick
nowledge.org/news-blog/blogs/blurred-lines-copyright-infringement-and-samp.
See Schrodt, Legal Fight, supra note 11; Charles Cronin, I Hear America Suing:
Music Copyright Infringement in the Era of Electronic Sound, 66 HASTINGS L.J.
1187, 1187–88 (2014).
14
Here, “practically” means actually using the patent for its intended purpose. J. Jason Williams, et al., Strategies for Combating Patent Trolls, 17 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 367, 368, 368 n.1 (2010).
15
Id.
16
See Tim Wu, The shady one-man corporation that’s destroying hip-hop,
SLATE (Nov. 16, 2006, 1:50 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/culturebox/2006/11/jayz_versus_the_sample_troll.htm; Siy, supra note 13; Kirn, supra
note 13. For a more detailed discussion of this practice and “copyright trolls,” see

2016]

EXCLUSIVE GROOVE

243

based on unauthorized sampling.17 Broad standards for finding copyright infringement based on similarity like those applied in the
“Blurred Lines” case might give sample trolls a new opportunity for
exploitation.18 Even more concerning is the possibility of publishers
and record labels being inspired by this practice and utilizing similar
strategies as a component of their business models; some evidence
seems to suggest they may already be doing so.19
Even though the statistics discussed earlier in this Note may
seem to indicate that the domestic and global music markets are stable and healthy, they are in fact in the midst of a major reorganization.20 With the rise of home recording and digital production, the
market has been saturated with new music, leading to a rise in the
importance of independent artists and labels.21 Most importantly, the
classic model by which an entertainment entity might exploit music
product is no longer reliable.22 Peer-to-peer file sharing and digital
distribution have had a profound effect on the market for music, requiring traditionally structured entertainment businesses to redesign
their profit schemes or risk obsolescence.23 There are more listeners
and musicians than ever before, but the industry remains unsure how
to combine the two into a profitable and sustainable system.24
Because the industry can no longer rely on record sales as a
foundational profit tool, these new business models will have to take
advantage of diverse exploitation opportunities that reflect music’s

James DeBriyn, Shedding Light on Copyright Trolls: An Analysis of Mass Copyright Litigation in the Age of Statutory Damages, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 79, 86
(2012).
17
DeBriyn, supra note 16, at 86; Wu supra note 16; Siy, supra note 13; Kirn,
supra note 13.
18
See Siy, supra note 13; Kirn, supra note 13.
19
See DeBriyn, supra note 16, at 79, 82. Recently, there has also been a wave
of increasingly attenuated substantial similarity claims being brought by publishers and record labels rather than the original artists. For examples, see infra Sections IV. A. & B.
20
DASILVA, supra note 1, at 4; MICHAEL MASNICK ET AL., THE SKY IS
RISING: 2014 EDITION 3–5 (2014).
21
See MASNICK, supra note 20, at 4.
22
DASILVA, supra note 1, at 4; MASNICK, supra note 20, at 5.
23
See DASILVA, supra note 1, at 4; MASNICK, supra note 20, at 4–5.
24
DASILVA, supra note 1, at 4; MASNICK, supra note 20, at 8–9.
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shifting economic locus.25 Under the current American copyright regime, broad interpretation of standards for finding actionable infringement have created a tempting new low-risk-high-reward monetization outlet in profiting from infringement disputes.26 Sample
trolls, record labels, publishers, and private rights-holders alike can
exploit these standards and use infringement claims based on similarity as a profit tool.27
With the democratization of production technology and the
overall simplification of musical styles, the chances of unconscious
or even coincidental copying have greatly increased.28 Simply put,
the more music there is, the more likely it is that one piece will sound
substantially similar to another.29 Additionally, broad and convoluted substantial similarity standards make for outstandingly unpredictable jury decisions.30 This high potential for perceived similarity
and low confidence in jury decisions has made industry participants
increasingly skittish when confronted with potential infringement
disputes, quickly resorting to settlement rather than defending
against the claimant.31
This Note will argue that the current standards for finding copyright infringement of musical compositions are overly broad and all
but inapplicable to modern music business and culture. Additionally, these broad standards invite the destructive trend of monetizing
copyright interests through litigation potential, harming both musicians and the market for music itself.32 The first part of this Note
will review the current condition of the music industry and why infringement monetization has become a tempting profit opportunity.
The second part will briefly discuss the history of U.S. copyright

25

DASILVA, supra note 1, at 4; MASNICK, supra note 20, at 5, 9.
See Cronin, supra note 13, at 1187–88.
27
See Kirn, supra note 13.
28
Id.
29
This observation is discussed at greater length later in this note. See infra
Section IV. A.
30
See Cronin, supra note 13, at 1188.
31
Id.
32
It should be noted that these issues are not exclusive to the entertainment
industry, and all creative industries are potentially at risk for a similar wave of
damaging litigation. For a broader discussion of copyright dispute monetization
and its impact on other industries, see generally DeBriyn, supra note 16.
26
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law as it pertains to musical compositions. The third part will analyze the components and application of modern infringement standards, using the Ninth Circuit’s approach and the “Blurred Lines”
case as illustrative examples. The fourth part addresses potential effects of these standards on artists and the music industry as a whole.
And finally, the fifth part will explore proposed solutions to the perceived inequities inherent in our current infringement structure, as
well as the complicated implications of each. This Note will propose
a comprehensive restructuring of the current framework by blending
commonly suggested proposals into one consistent system.
I. PERSPECTIVE ON THE MUSIC INDUSTRY
In the mid to late 2000s, the driving forces behind the music industry for the previous fifty years seemed paralyzed.33 Piracy and
peer-to-peer file sharing were causing substantial losses for industry
participants,34 and these disruptive technologies had rendered traditional monetization strategies unreliable.35 The industry as a whole
was forced to reorganize and develop profit models that reflected
music’s shifting economic value in the face of new and innovative
industry participants.36
As of 2016, much of the remaining “doom and gloom” surrounding entertainment investment generally is misguided, and the media
industries as a whole are in the midst of a global renaissance of creative content.37 Film and TV investment has been steadily rising
since 2000, and both industries have reached somewhat of a “golden
age.”38 The accessibility of inexpensive and easy-to-use creative
production tools spurred staggering growth in creative output over
the last decade,39 and digital distribution platforms allow for

33

See DASILVA, supra note 1, at 4; MASNICK, supra note 20, at 6–7.
See DASILVA, supra note 1, at 4, 13. There was a sharp decrease in music
royalty revenues during this time period, and record sales, which had steadily
grown since the early 2000’s, leveled off. See MASNICK, supra note 20, at 6–7.
35
See DASILVA, supra note 1, at 4, 13; MASNICK, supra note 20, at 5, 9.
36
See DASILVA, supra note 1, at 4, 13; MASNICK, supra note 20, at 3, 5.
37
MASNICK, supra note 20, at 3.
38
From 1990 to 2010, movie investment more than doubled from less than
$11 billion to just short of $24 billion. Id. at 2.
39
Id. at 4.
34
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cheap—or even free—global marketing proliferation, making it easier for independent artists to achieve widespread popularity.40 There
is more content than ever, and profit exploitation opportunities in
the new corpus are vast and diverse.41
Even though more money and content are flowing through the
entertainment industries than a decade ago, the profit distributions
are vastly different.42 Democratization in the industry has shaken the
dominant position of the industry’s major players and spread profit
distributions across a wider array of independent studios, publishers,
and labels.43 This is particularly true in the music industry where a
substantial amount of investment interest has been directed towards
access platforms rather than content development.44 Additionally
because album sales are no longer reliable profit generators, industry
players must take advantage of more diverse exploitation opportunities.45 For example, likely due to the impersonal nature of digital
distribution, there has been a spike in consumer demand for live music experiences, stimulating a wave of investor interest in music festivals and venues.46
The music industry is in a better position than it was a decade
ago, but its investment market is still fragile.47 Even though the live
music industry has grown substantially over the last few years, some
analysts are skeptical of the model’s sustainability, and there have
already been tribulations in the burgeoning market.48 If the live mu-

40

See id.
See id.; DASILVA, supra note 1, at 4.
42
MASNICK, supra note 20, at 3–4.
43
Id.
44
See id. at 4, 8. See, e.g., Douglas Macmillan, et al., Spotify Raises $1 Billion
in Debt Financing, WALL ST. J. (March 29, 2016, 6:15 PM), http://www.wsj.com
/articles/spotify-raises-1-billion-in-debt-financing-1459284467.
45
DASILVA, supra note 1, at 4; MASNICK, supra note 20, at 5, 9.
46
MASNICK, supra note 20, at 7.
47
See id.; DASILVA, supra note 1, at 4. See, e.g., Ryan Mac, The Fall Of SFX:
From Billion Dollar Company To Bankruptcy Watch, FORBES (Aug. 24, 2015,
6:13 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/2015/08/24/the-fall-of-an-edmempire-sfx/#2715e4857a0be9b695f8c077.
48
MASNICK, supra note 20, at 4. Publicly traded EDM festival giant SFX
recently filed for bankruptcy to aide in its reorganization despite widespread confidence in the company’s model and management. This decision will inject more
41
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sic bubble were to collapse, the industry might confront issues similar to those that arose a decade ago. Uncertainty among labels and
publishers as to the future of music monetization schemes will only
exacerbate apprehension in music investment.49
Evidence seems to suggest that in reaction, industry participants
are more frequently using copyright infringement claims as a way
of garnering profits from rights-holdings.50 To avoid expensive and
unpredictable litigation, those accused of infringement are quick to
settle claims by paying out lump sums or granting royalty participations while risk to the claimant in accusing a supposed infringer remains nugatory.51 Modern copyright infringement standards for music compositions foster this practice to the detriment of artists and
the music industry as a whole.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Early Music Copyright Infringement Law
To appreciate the highly problematic nature of modern music
law, it is important to understand its historical context. Even though
it may seem surprising in retrospect, “music” has not always been
considered copyrightable material.52 English common law did not
extended protection to musical compositions until 1777 when Johann Christian Bach won an infringement suit against a London music publisher for unauthorized printing and distribution of his sonatas.53 In the U.S., compositions were not protected until 1831 when

uncertainty into the music festival market which has become somewhat of a cornerstone of the modern popular music model. Mac, supra note 47; Ben Sisario,
SFX Entertainment Declares Bankruptcy, NY TIMES (Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.
nytimes.com/2016/02/02/business/media/sfx-entertainment-declares-bankruptcy.
html?_r=0.
49
See MASNICK, supra note 20, at 5.
50
See Schrodt, Legal Fight, supra note 11; Cronin, supra note 13, at 1187–
88; Ali Sternburg, Why Are We Seeing New Sampling Suits Over Old Songs?,
PROJECT DISCO (April 9, 2014), http://www.project-disco.org/intellectual-property/040914-why-are-we-seeing-new-sampling-suits-over-old-songs/#.V-GSxaIr
Isl. For more examples of these suits, see infra Sections IV. A. & B.
51
See Cronin, supra note 13, at 1187–88.
52
Id. at 1194.
53
Id. at 1194–95.
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Congress first revised the Copyright Act of 1790 to specifically include musical works.54
Early music infringement disputes in Britain and the U.S. were
similar, in that claims were based on reproduction of the work in
totality rather than misappropriation of compositional portions.55
However, unlike early British disputes which generally dealt with
serious works like Bach’s, even early infringement claims in the
U.S. “dealt with less rarified works.”56 To profit from their compositions, American musicians needed to fill gaps in the European
canon that appealed to other aspects of American musical taste.57
By the early 1900s, pianos were a popular household article and
the publication and sale of sheet music had grown into formidable
industries.58 The advent of public radio in the early century created
yet another profitable market for the distribution and consumption
of music.59 At the forefront of this new industry were the songwriters and music publishers of New York’s Tin Pan Alley who held a
dominant role in the popular music industry from the late 1800s until
the advent of ‘Rock & Roll’ in the 1950s.60
B. The Development of “Pop” Music and Substantial Similarity
The modern framework of music copyright originated in response to the rise of Tin Pan Alley and the flourishing market for
popular music at the turn of the twentieth century.61 Courts struggled
54

Id. at 1195.
Id. at 1208.
56
Id. at 1198. Because the Copyright Act only applied to domestically produced works until 1891, publishers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
could readily distribute serious European works without license. Consequently,
American musicians generally focused on the production of simpler works meant
for a wider audience. See id. at 1200–01.
57
Id. at 1200–01.
58
Id. at 1205–06. Because sheet music was the primary distribution medium
for musical compositions at the time, these new popular compositions were simpler than more serious works so as to be easily replicated by amateur performers.
Id. at 1204–06. During this time period, suits based on infringement of the performance right became more common. However, claims for infringement of the performance right were still based on unauthorized performance of the work in totality. Id. at 1208.
59
Id. at 1207.
60
See generally id. at 1204–07.
61
See id. at 1204.
55
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to develop standards that would be applicable to this new kind of
music while protecting its growing economic value.62 The resulting
case law established some of the more problematic and hotly debated doctrines of American music law.63 By this time, courts had
recognized that limiting the scope of copyright protection to the reproduction or performance of only the work’s literal expression
would allow infringers to avoid prosecution through immaterial variations.64 However, offering overbroad protection could blur the distinction between copyrightable expression and mere ideas, so the
doctrine of substantial similarity developed to resolve that issue.65
Under the substantial similarity doctrine, a plaintiff rightsholder can win on an infringement claim by showing: 1) ownership
of a valid copyrighted work; 2) that the defendant in fact copied the
plaintiff’s protected work (commonly referred to as access); and 3)
that the resultant work is substantially similar to the plaintiff’s original (also known as unlawful appropriation).66 This broader standard for infringement and the success of Tin Pan Alley songwriters
invited a new wave of claims brought by songwriters seeking to capitalize on the industry’s burgeoning economic opportunities.67 The
simple nature of popular music at the time lowered the amount of
original copyrightable content in compositions, and plaintiffs’
claims for infringement became more abstracted.68 One of the most
infamous of these plaintiffs was the litigious and mentally ill Ira
Arnstein.69
C. Arnstein v. Porter and the Lay Listener Test
Arnstein was notorious for bringing attenuated and ultimately
unsuccessful suits for copyright infringement against some the most
popular artists of his time based on minute similarities between the
62

See id. at 1208–09.
See id. at 1204, 1208–09.
64
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
65
See id.
66
See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468–69 (2d Cir. 1946).
67
Cronin, supra note 13, at 1208–10.
68
Boosey v. Empire Music was the first decision regarding infringement
based on “qualitatively slight musical similarities between the disputed musical
works.” Cronin, supra note 13, at 1209. For the original case, see generally
Boosey v. Empire Music Co., 224 F. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
69
Cronin, supra note 13, at 1211–12.
63
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works.70 In his most memorable escapade, Arnstein sued Cole Porter, claiming the latter had copied one of his protected compositions.71 At trial, Porter successfully motioned for summary judgment, but the decision was reversed on appeal to the Second Circuit.72 The framework set forth in the Second Circuit’s reversal retains precedential significance to this day and influences infringement decisions across all media of expressive works.73
The court determined that substantial subjective similarity was
a question of fact to be determined by a jury comprised of the work’s
intended audience.74 According to the court, popular music was
written for the musically uneducated masses, and only a lay listener
could properly determine the degree of similarity.75 Thus, the question in music infringement cases became whether the defendant took
“so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners” comprising
the work’s intended audience as to render the works substantially
similar.76 In his opinion, Judge Jerome Frank expressed particular
distaste for allowing expert testimony on the question of substantial
similarity, stating that to do so would be to treat relatively simple
popular works like caviar, “and [the] plaintiff’s and defendant’s
compositions [were] not caviar.” 77
The Arnstein opinion illustrates an unfortunate sentiment that
has permeated into the modern discourse surrounding music copyright, namely that popular music is somehow less fit for serious analysis than more “learned” forms.78 This approach to the assessment
of popular music ignores the value of quantitative and objective
evaluation by those versed in the artistry, science, and language of

70

Id.
Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 467; see also Cronin, supra note 13, at 1211–13.
72
Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 467.
73
Almost all of the circuits have adopted some version of the Second Circuit’s “Lay Listener Test.” See Cronin, supra note 13, at 1212.
74
Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473.
75
Id.
76
The question of subjective substantial similarity determines whether the
“defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff.” Id.
77
Id.
78
See, e.g., Cronin, supra note 13, at 1193 (“[W]hat we today consider to be
popular music, as that term was understood in the 1940s, is actually something
else—perhaps “popular sound,” or, less charitably, “popular noise.”).
71
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music.79 Experiments on this question have shown that lay juries are
fundamentally ill-equipped to decipher musical similarities but that
those with previous musical training are objectively more accurate
in their analysis.80 This issue has only been exacerbated by the increasingly complicated system of modern music copyright.
D. Dual Regime of Music Copyright: Music v. Sound
It is important to note that current music copyright law is far
more complex than it was in the days of Arnstein.81 By the midcentury, sales for phonorecords had overtaken the market for sheet
music as the primary avenue for music distribution.82 In response,
Congress revised the Copyright Act in 1976 as to specifically include protection for sound recordings.83 Compositions can be submitted for registration in the form of sound recordings, but only the
musical elements contained within are protected.84 Copyrights in
sound recordings were meant to be separate and distinct from the
protections allotted to the recording’s underlying musical composition, creating two sets of copyrights in pieces of recorded music.85
This bifurcated system imposes a distinction between musical elements and sonic qualities dictated by performance.86 The difference
between the protections extended to musical compositions and the
recorded performances that embody them are subtle and, at times,
confusing.
To clarify the distinction between compositional and performance qualities, consider for example the tradition of “covering”
songs in music. Musicians frequently perform each other’s songs in
79

See Jamie Lund, Fixing Music Copyright, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 61, 86–90
(2013).
80
Id.
81
See Cronin, supra note 13, at 1239.
82
Cronin, supra note 13, at 1213, 1213 n.139, 1214.
83
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (2012); see also Lund, supra note 79, at 69.
84
See Lund, supra note 79, at 66–67, 67 n. 35; see also U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION OF MUSICAL COMPOSITIONS AND SOUND
RECORDINGS 1 (2012), https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ56a.pdf (“Sending a
musical composition in the form of a phonorecord [for example, cassette tape, LP,
or CD] does not necessarily mean that there is a claim to copyright in the sound
recording.”).
85
Lund, supra note 79, at 66.
86
This approach recognizes traditionally accepted distinctions between songwriters and performers in the musical arts. Id.
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the style of a different genre with little to no change in the original’s
underlying melodies, lyrics, and composition. The resulting cover
might be performed at a different tempo, in a different key, or with
different rhythmic emphasis, but it is still musically identical to the
original.87 From a sonic perspective, the cover and the original may
not be similar at all, and the overall effect of the music may completely change. In a scenario where identical compositions are performed in different styles, lay listeners are hard-pressed to properly
identify the level of musical similarity.88
Further complicating this distinction between music and sound,
the proliferation of audio recording technology has melded the processes of composition and recording.89 Unlike works by Beethoven
or the Tin Pan Alley songwriters, modern popular songs are rarely
written out in formal notation before their performance and are often
composed in tandem with their recording.90 Musicians will frequently make decisions during the recording process with both sonic
and compositional considerations in mind, and for genres like electronic music, sonic qualities are a primary authorial consideration.91
This change in the creative process has made it increasingly difficult
to differentiate between the sonic and musical expressions in a
sound recording.92 Problematically, that distinction is integral to analyzing music under modern copyright infringement frameworks.

For an example, listen to Johnny Cash’s cover of “Hurt” by Nine Inch Nails
and compare with the original.
88
See Lund, supra note 79, at 86–88.
89
See Cronin, supra note 13, at 1215–18.
90
Id.
91
The proliferation of electronic recording technologies increased authorial
focus on secondary non-musical elements like dynamics and timbre. Similarly,
wide use of synthesizers, drum machines, sequencers, and samplers in popular
genres placed new value on creative sound design, drawing authorial importance
from the primary musical considerations of traditional composers. See Cronin,
supra note 13, at 1214, 1218; MARK J. BUTLER, UNLOCKING THE GROOVE:
RHYTHM, METER, AND MUSICAL DESIGN IN ELECTRONIC DANCE MUSIC, 33 (Ind.
Univ. Press 2006) (ebook).
92
See generally Cronin supra note 13, at 1213–14.
87
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III. THE MODERN FRAMEWORK
A. The Ninth Circuit Approach: The Extrinsic and Intrinsic Tests
Case law in the Ninth Circuit is some of the most influential in
the copyright arena93 but, regrettably, illustrates common issues in
copyright doctrine found across the circuits. As copyright law became more complex and attenuated infringement claims became
more common, the court worked to develop consistent tests for substantial similarity that would be applicable across all mediums of
protected creative works.94 In 1977, television producers Sid and
Marty Krofft brought suit against McDonald’s for allegedly infringing their children’s television character “H.R. Pufnstuf” by using a
substantially similar character in advertisements.95 The Kroffts won
at trial, and McDonald’s appealed to the Ninth Circuit.96
Influenced by the Second Circuit’s approach, the Krofft court
sought to create a broadly applicable limiting principle that would
clearly delineate which specific elements of a creative work were
protected expressions and which were unprotectable ideas.97 The
court reasoned that the two-prong framework used by the Second
Circuit implied this distinction and correctly noted that only elements of original expression could be considered when determining
subjective similarity.98 Based on this observation, the court outlined
a two-step analysis for substantial similarity known as the “extrinsic

93
This is due to the rise of Southern California as the United States entertainment epicenter.
94
See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod.’s, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562
F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977).
95
Id. at 1160.
96
Id. at 1160–61.
97
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) (expounding the lay
listener test); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930)
(expounding the abstractions test); Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1163–65, (drawing influence from both).
98
Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164–65.
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and intrinsic tests.”99 Later cases have extensively altered the original tests to clarify their application but still maintain the same twopronged structure.100
Under current interpretations, the extrinsic component of the
two-part test refers to an objective comparison of “all objective manifestations of expression” in the works based on “articulable similarities.”101 Though ultimately a question for the trier of fact, the
question of extrinsic similarity can often be resolved as a matter of
law.102 During the extrinsic test, the court can consider external criteria like expert testimony to aid in the necessary “analytical dissection.”103
Analytical dissection requires the jury or presiding judge to
break the works down into their specific expressive elements and
then compare those elements standing alone for evidence of copying
measured by substantial similarity.104 Here, the fact finder determines the scope of protection in the plaintiff’s work by deciding
which elements are original protected expressions and which are unprotectable ideas.105 The fact finder must “filter out” the unprotected
or unprotectable elements and only consider similarities between the
remaining components.106

99

The extrinsic test satisfies the first requirement of copying in fact, while
the intrinsic addresses unlawful appropriation measured by subjective substantial
similarity. Id. at 1164–65.
100
See Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002);
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994);
Metcalf v. Bochco, 294 F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 2002).
101
Cavalier, 297 F.3d at 822.
102
Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164.
103
Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13–06004 JAK (AGRx),
2014 WL 7877773, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2014); Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d
841, 845 (9th Cir. 2004).
104
Williams, 2014 WL 7877773, at *6; Cavalier, 297 F.3d at 822–23.
105
See Williams, 2014 WL 7877773, at *6; Cavalier, 297 F.3d at 822–23.
106
Williams, 2014 WL 7877773, at *6; “A court “must take care to inquire
only whether ‘the protectible elements, standing alone, are substantially similar.’”
Cavalier, 297 F.3d at 822–23. Courts have defined the extrinsic test quite inconsistently. Some decisions have expounded that the extrinsic test is actually a test
for both similarity of ideas and expression with the objective of showing copying
in fact. But, those same decisions state that the fact finder must filter out un-protectable elements and only consider those that are protected. If that were actually
the case, the question of similarity in idea would be irrelevant because ideas are
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It must be noted here that not all components of a work have to
be original expressions for the work as a whole to receive copyright
protection.107 Additionally, a sufficiently original arrangement of individually unprotectable elements can itself constitute a protectable
expression.108 In the Ninth Circuit, this principle is commonly referred to as the Metcalf doctrine. The court has stated that the idea–
expression distinction used for analytical dissection during the extrinsic test does not obscure the Metcalf doctrine’s applicability.109
As its limiting principles, the court primarily uses the doctrines of
merger and scénes á faire to determine what elements in a work are
unprotectable and should be filtered.110
not protectable expression. See, e.g., Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845 (9th
Cir. 2004).
107
See Metcalf v. Bochco, 294 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2002).
108
“Each note in a scale, for example, is not protectable, but a pattern of notes
in a tune may earn copyright protection.” Id. The arrangement of these components becomes an expression itself, but the content of those components remains
un-protectable. See id.
109
Williams, 2014 WL 7877773, at *6; Applying the extrinsic test to protectable arrangements of individually un-protectable elements is particularly difficult.
During analytical dissection, the fact finder would have to ignore the content of
unprotected individual ideas but somehow consider the effect of their arrangement
for comparison. See generally Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 848. It should be noted that
music compositions are fundamentally arrangements of un-protectable components. See id. A chord progression or rhythm alone—unless outstandingly
unique—would not qualify for copyright protection, but an arrangement of those
components would. See id. The “Blurred Lines” case eventually turns on this observation.
110
“[W]hen an idea and its expression are indistinguishable,” they are said to
have merged, and “the expression will only be protected against near identical
copying.” Apple, 35 F.3d at 1444. When similar features are ‘as a practical matter
indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a given [idea],’” those components are considered scénes á faire and are not protected under copyright. Id.
However, these doctrines alone are not adequate guides for distinguishing expressions from ideas during analytical dissection. Taken in tandem with the Metcalf
doctrine, original arrangements of scénes á faire or merged components would
receive protection, but the court provides little guidance as to what particular qualities of these arrangements the jury should consider expressive during analytical
dissection. See generally Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 848. These doctrines are also difficult to apply to the varied works protected by copyright. See id. For example, it is
clear that in a narrative work the concept of star crossed lovers is scénes á faire,
but application of that doctrine to choreography, sculpture, or software would be
more difficult.

256

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:238

The intrinsic portion of the framework involves a subjective determination of similarity in the “total concept and feel” of the works’
protected expressions from the perspective of an “ordinary reasonable audience.”111 Here, the fact finder must decide whether those
similarities are substantial enough to constitute unlawful appropriation by the defendant.112 Because the test is meant to be purely subjective, the Ninth Circuit does not allow expert testimony or analytical dissection during the intrinsic portion, and the question is exclusively left to the jury.113 Instead of dissecting the works into their
individual expressive elements and comparing them in isolation, the
jury must subjectively consider the similarities between the “total
concept and feel” of both works’ protectable expressions as a
whole.114
As noted above, to fix the scope of protection extended to a particular work the fact finder must determine which elements of the
work are protected original expressions and filter the unprotectable
elements during the extrinsic test.115 According to the court, the fact
finder should apply dissection in the extrinsic test and compare those
elements in isolation.116 Then, the jury must subjectively compare
the “total concept and feel” of the remaining protectable components as a whole without regard to evidence presented for the extrinsic analysis and observations made during analytical dissection.117
The lack of definitive boundaries between protectable expressions
and unprotectable ideas for jurors to follow suggests a “liberal

111

Cavalier, 297 F.3d at 822.
See id.
113
“Because this is an intrinsic test, analytic dissection and expert testimony
are not appropriate.” Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod.’s, Inc. v. McDonald’s
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977). “For the purposes of summary judgment, only the extrinsic test is important because the subjective question whether
works are intrinsically similar must be left to the jury.” Swirsky v. Carey, 376
F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2004).
114
See Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164 (disallowing analytical dissection); Cavalier,
297 F.3d at 822 (requiring analysis of “total concept and feel”).
115
Williams, 2014 WL 7877773, at *6.
116
Id.
117
See Cavalier, 297 F.3d at 822.; Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164 (disallowing analytical dissection and consideration of expert testimony during intrinsic test).
112
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amount of subjectivity” in the determination.118 This subjectivity
mires an already complicated standard, further confusing jurors and
producing inconsistent precedent with less predictable outcomes.119
B. Problems with the Ninth Circuit’s Approach
If you find this system cumbersome and esoteric that is because,
in fact, it is. Commentators frequently critique the Ninth Circuit’s
approach as convoluted and confusing to judges, jurors, and practitioners.120 This breakdown in communication between the bench
and jury leads to erratic decisions, inviting more attenuated claims
and encouraging infringement itself.121 Furthermore, disallowing
expert testimony to clarify appropriate application of the intrinsic
test to the medium in question only exacerbates this disconnect.122
Both infringers and plaintiffs are more likely to abuse the system
when outcomes are more erratic, believing that it is worth it to “roll
the dice” as the potential benefits outweigh the risk.123
The Ninth Circuit’s two-pronged test highlights a major issue in
judicial precedent for copyright law generally—the limited applicability of legal vocabulary to the analysis of creative works. The pontifications of experts, however exclusive in their accessibility, are at
least consistent in that they draw from a commonly accepted understanding of the medium.124 Unlike the legalisms of copyright law,
the vocabulary of creative critique is tailored to the specific medium
118

Nicholas R. Monlux, An Invitation for Infringement: How the Ninth Circuit’s Extrinsic and Intrinsic Similarity Tests Encourage Infringement: An Analysis Using Reece v. Island Treasures Art Gallery, 56 J., COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A.
543, 553 (2008).
119
See id.
120
See, e.g., Nicole K. Roodhuyzen, Do We Even Need a Test? A Reevaluation
of Assessing Substantial Similarity in a Copyright Infringement Case, 15 J.L. &
POL’Y 1375, 1377 (2007); Miah Rosenberg, Do You Hear What I Hear?: Expert
Testimony in Music Infringement Cases in the Ninth Circuit, 39 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1669, 1688–89 (2006); Montgomery Frankel, From Krofft to Shaw, and
Beyond, 40 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 429, 453 (1990); Monlux, supra note 118, at
544.
121
See Monlux, supra note 118, at 545.
122
Rosenberg, supra note 120, at 1676–77.
123
See Monlux, supra note 118, at 545.
124
But even though expert evaluations are consistent in their methods, these
accepted approaches may not fall within the boundaries of judicial doctrine. See
Rosenberg, supra note 120, at 1689.
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it seeks to analyze. As courts have recognized, judges are poor
judges of art,125 and judicial doctrines can prove more confusing
than enlightening. This convolution is particularly problematic
when applying standards meant to encompass all creative works rather than ones tailored to the medium in question.
However carefully constructed, the tests provide no guidance on
their application to varying creative mediums or the weight provided
to each test.126 The system may be appropriate in its application to
narrative works where merged and scénes á faire elements are more
easily identified, but it seems far less effective when applied to art
forms where the lines between idea and expression are vague.127 Filtration seems particularly difficult when a work consists of copyrightable arrangements of uncopyrightable components protectable
under the Metcalf doctrine. In these cases, application of the “total
concept” doctrine becomes dangerously close to extending protection to uncopyrightable and ill-defined ideas like genre, style, or
vibe.128

125
See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52
(1903) (Holmes, J.) (“It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained
only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme
some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty
would make them repulsive until the public had learned the new language in
which their author spoke. It may be more than doubted, for instance, whether
the etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection
when seen for the first time. At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they command the interest of any public, they have a commercial value -- it would be bold
to say that they have not an aesthetic and educational value -- and the taste of any
public is not to be treated with contempt.”).
126
Frankel, supra note 120, at 453.
127
See Frankel, supra note 120, at 433; see also Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
128
The outcome of Williams v. Bridgeport Music Inc. illustrates the implications of this imprecise framework. See generally Williams v. Bridgeport Music,
Inc., No. LA CV13–06004 JAK (AGRx), 2014 WL 7877773 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30,
2014).
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C. Music under the Ninth Circuit Tests
The Ninth Circuit’s extrinsic and intrinsic system is quite difficult to apply in cases regarding recorded musical compositions.129
As explained earlier, a piece of recorded music embodies two distinct copyrights––one in the recording itself and another in its underlying musical composition.130 However firm the distinction between music and sound was originally designed to be, application of
the analytical dissection and “total concept” approach essentially requires distortion of that delineation.
This would be particularly true in cases regarding works that
were written and recorded contemporaneously. Composition and
performance overlap when musical decisions are made as to produce
particular sonic effects normally dictated by the composition’s performance. In these cases, the rights extended to the recording and its
underlying composition are easily confused but remain integral to
proper application of the extrinsic-intrinsic tests. For an example of
this distinction in practice under Ninth Circuit standards, consider
the surprisingly well-decided case of Newton v. Diamond.131
In Newton, flautist James W. Newton brought an infringement
suit against the Beastie Boys claiming the latter had unlawfully appropriated a portion of his composition “Choir” by sampling the
song’s opening riff without license.132 The Beastie Boys had obtained a license from Newton’s record label to sample the recorded
material but had not acquired a license to use the underlying composition.133 The registered score for “Choir” contained minimal
original musical content and only a few vague performance instructions.134 The recording, on the other hand, elaborated on the basic
melodies and contained sonic performance qualities not dictated by

“The application of the extrinsic test, which assesses substantial similarity
of ideas and expression, to music compositions is a somewhat unnatural task
guided by relatively little precedent.” Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 848 (9th
Cir. 2004).
130
Lund, supra note 79, at 66.
131
See generally Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004).
132
Id. at 1191.
133
Id.
134
Cronin, supra note 13, at 1228.
129
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the notation.135 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit determined that Newton’s copyright in the composition did not extend to embellishments
or performance qualities omitted from the registered score and that
those elements should be filtered out during the extrinsic test.136 Furthermore, because the defendants had only sampled a three note
phrase from the score, their use was de minimis and did not infringe
on Newton’s composition.137 Newton was rightly decided, but more
recent decisions fail to follow its guidelines.
D. The “Blurred Lines” Case: An Illustrative Example
The outcome of Williams v. Bridgeport shows how jurors can
easily—even understandably—confuse musical and performance
qualities when applying the Ninth Circuit’s test to compositions.138
In light of the Newton decision, the outcome of the “Blurred Lines”
case “appears indefensibly regressive,” being fundamentally at odds
with traditional Ninth Circuit interpretations of compositional copyright disputes.139 As noted, experiments on the subject have shown
that lay listeners are ill-equipped to distinguish which qualities of a
musical work are dictated by its composition and which are products
of its performance.140 The intersection of the “Lay Listener Test,”
Metcalf doctrine, and “total concept and feel” approach create a ripe
opportunity for overly broad interpretation by jurors and erratic subjective decisions.141
The procedural history of the “Blurred Lines” dispute began
when—after failing to reach a settlement regarding the potential infringement claim by the Gaye family against them—Pharrell Williams and Robin Thicke filed an action for declaratory judgment in
their favor on the question.142 According to Williams and Thicke,
the Gaye family’s accusation hinged on a perceived similarity between the sound and feel of “Blurred Lines” and Marvin Gaye’s

135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142

Id.
Newton, 388 F.3d at 1193–94.
Id. at 1196–97; Cronin, supra note 13, at 1229.
See Cronin, supra note 13, at 1230–31.
Id.
Lund, supra note 79, at 78–86.
See generally id.
See generally Complaint, supra note 5, at 2.
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“Got to Give It Up.”143 In their ultimately unsuccessful complaint
for declaratory judgment, the artists argued that feel and sound were
not protected elements of a compositional copyright and that extending protection to these qualities would give rights-holders ownership
over entire genres of music.144 Williams and Thicke stated that
“Blurred Lines” was written to “evoke an era” of music rather than
to specifically imitate “Got to Give It Up” and that any similar musical devices between the two were commonly used by other songwriters of the time or were derived from unprotected elements of the
underlying composition to Gaye’s work.145 In response, the Gaye
family filed a suit for infringement, arguing that these similarities
surpassed mere influence in sound and feel and that the artists had
unlawfully appropriated protected material from “Got to Give It
Up.”146
It must be noted that “Got to Give It Up” was recorded and registered in 1977 when the 1909 Copyright Act was still in effect.147
Under the 1909 Act, only written musical notation—and not sound
recordings—could be submitted for registration of compositional
works, but Gaye, who could not read or write musical notation, composed and recorded the song in the same process.148 After recording
the song, Gaye and his publisher submitted a lead sheet prepared by
a third party for registration that only contained a limited outline of
the music actually performed on the recording.149 The Gaye family
argued that the court should consider the recorded version of the
143

Id. It should be noted that in the official records the court, claimants, and
expert witnesses refrained from using these words specifically, but the terms were
used by Williams and Thicke in their complaint.
144
See id.
145
See id. However, Thicke said in an interview that he and Williams wrote
“Blurred Lines” to have the same groove as “Got to Give It Up.” See Stelios Phili,
Robin Thicke on That Banned Video, Collaborating with 2 Chainz and Kendrick
Lamar, and His New Film, GQ (May 6, 2013 9:20 PM), http://www.gq.com/story
/robin-thicke-interview-blurred-lines-music-video-collaborating-with-2-chainzand-kendrick-lamar-mercy.
146
Defendants’ Counterclaim at 14, Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No.
LA CV13–06004 JAK (AGRx), 2014 WL 7877773 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2014),
available at http://mcir.usc.edu/inplay/Documents/gayecounterclaim.pdf.
147
Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13–06004 JAK (AGRx),
2014 WL 7877773, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2014).
148
Id.
149
Id.
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work when applying the extrinsic test, even though only the lead
sheet was registered.150 The presiding judge disagreed, finding that
the plaintiffs’ copyright only protected music contained in the score
and only the content of the lead sheet could be considered.151 Anything outside of the registered lead sheet had to be filtered from the
analysis.152
From an objective standpoint, “Blurred Lines” does not copy
any literal compositional elements from the registered score for
“Got to Give It Up.”153 However, with support from expert testimony, the family argued that even though Williams and Thicke had
not literally copied the composition, the artists had borrowed enough
elements from the song to produce a substantially similar structure
and overall effect.154 The family’s experts opined that “Blurred
Lines” and “Got to Give It Up” were substantially similar in “constellation” of those elements and that these similarities in arrangement were significant enough to satisfy the extrinsic–intrinsic test
even absent literal copying of the composition’s content.155
The litigation became a whirlwind of motions and countersuits
that ultimately culminated in a unanimous jury decision for the
Gayes.156 Whatever the specific reasoning behind the decision may
have been, it does seem clear that the jurors were either confused by
or ignored the distinction between performance and compositional
elements.157 Because the scores as written were objectively dissimilar, the jury’s decision appeared to be based on external criteria
from the sound recording or unprotectable sonic and performance
qualities that should have been filtered from the analysis.158

150

A lead sheet is a limited outline of the basic musical themes in a song, and
it generally contains very few performance notes. Id.
151
Id. at *10.
152
Id.
153
Id. at *13.
154
See Defendants’ Counterclaim, supra note 146, at 14–15.
155
See id.
156
See Williams, 2014 WL 7877773, at *1; Cronin, supra note 13, at 1230–
31.
157
See Cronin, supra note 13, at 1231.
158
The jury may also have been influenced by Williams’ and Thicke’s inconsistent testimony and perceived dishonesty. Cronin, supra note 13, at 1231, 1231
n.231.
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“Blurred Lines” was clearly influenced by “Got to Give It Up,”
and it is quite reasonable to say that the songs sound similar. However, when only comparing the protected compositional expressions
and excluding the unprotected performance qualities, this similarity
does not rise to the level of copyright infringement on the composition. The “constellation” of creative decisions that the plaintiffs’ experts referred to included male falsetto vocals, alternating cowbell
patterns, and omission of guitar riffs, but all of these qualities are
unprotectable under past case law.159 This over-application of the
Metcalf doctrine essentially extends copyright protection in compositions to instrumentation decisions that are generally the realm of
recording and performance. But under “total concept and feel,”
these arrangement qualities are provided more probative weight than
the individual compositional elements. The music community criticized the decision as being inconsistent with modern music culture
by making commonly accepted levels of artistic influence actionable offenses.160
IV. EFFECT ON MUSICIANS AND THE INDUSTRY
A. Why Musicians are so Agitated: Impact on Artists
As applied in Williams, the Ninth Circuit’s system for finding
infringement has become almost inapplicable to modern music composition, and under it, artists can be punished for using culturally
accepted creative strategies.161 “Total concept and feel” as it pertains
to music compositions can easily be construed to include performance qualities that are not dictated by the underlying music. Expanding the scope of protection in compositions to this degree essentially gives rights-holders the sole privilege to perform songs in
a particular style and exclusive control over a sound or groove. This
expansion shifts probative value away from the actual content of the
music and improperly distorts the boundary between idea and expression by protecting style rather than composition.
Under this expanded scope, the protection afforded to seminal
works of a genre would be inequitably exaggerated and limit artistic
159

Defendants’ Counterclaim, supra note 146, at 14–15.
Over 200 artists filed a brief with the Ninth Circuit, supporting Williams’
and Thicke’s appeal. Schrodt, Hundreds of Musicians, supra note 11.
161
Id.; Swed, supra note 12 (stating that these practices have been accepted
by musicians for centuries).
160
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influence from a substantial portion of culturally important works.
Certain music has become so influential and pervasive in the collective cultural and artistic lexicons that the likelihood of substantial
similarity arising in new works is all but inevitable.162 For example,
the distinctive performance styles of artists like Michael Jackson
and James Brown are such definitive examples of their respective
genres that reference to their works is all but necessary to write
songs in those styles.163
With the growing popularity of retro-style songwriting, evoking
the sound of a culturally relevant artist has become a common practice welcomed by the listening public, but it might expose artists to
potential liability.164 Recently, Mark Ronson and his co-authors
were accused of infringement by a UK music publisher.165 The publisher claimed that Ronson’s wildly popular “Uptown Funk” infringed on the song “Oops Upside Your Head” by pioneering funk
group The Gap Band.166 The musical similarities between the two
songs are minimal and highly common to the funk genre generally,
but Ronson and his publishers quickly settled with their accusers.167
Commentators drew parallels between the “Uptown Funk” dispute
and the “Blurred Lines” litigation, believing Ronson and his team
settled in order to avoid unpredictable and potentially unfavorable
litigation.168
162

See generally Cronin, supra note 13, at 1230.
The merger and scénes á faire doctrines might be valid defenses against
this interpretation, but those doctrines are difficult to apply in cases regarding
compositional infringement. Genres like Rock & Roll and R&B draw heavily on
musical foundations developed by past artists of genres like Blues and Doo-Wop.
See Cronin, supra note 13, at 1216. Had these appropriations been considered
infringement, Rock & Roll would have essentially never existed. Because these
appropriations were used to develop new genres rather mimic the original, merger
and scenes-a-faire might not have protected these artists.
164
See Joanna Demers, Sound-Alikes, Law, and Style, 83 UMKC L. REV. 303,
303 (2014) (discussing “retromania” and the popularity of new “sound-alikes”).
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Instead of initiating a legal claim, the publisher sent a request to YouTube
to flag the song and keep any generated revenue in escrow until the matter was
resolved. Ed Christman, Inside the New Royalty Split for ‘Uptown Funk’: Who
Gets Paid What, BILLBOARD (May 4, 2015), http://www.billboard.com/articles/
business/6553861/uptown-funk-royalties-who-gets-paid.
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Id.
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Along with exponential growth in the sheer volume of music being created through accessible and inexpensive digital recording,
“sound alikes”169 are essentially guaranteed.170 Some might disagree
with this assessment, believing that composers draw inspiration
from an unlimited ethereal corpus, but this position would ignore
two fundamentally limiting qualities of music creation. Firstly, all
creative works, and especially music, are a product of their author’s
environment and exposure to other works.171 Secondly, music is a
limited art that draws from a finite domain of accepted quantitatively
definable sonic devices.172 The simplification of pop music for mass
consumption further limits these musical vocabularies and again increases the probability of similarity.173 Other creative mediums do
not have the same authoritative limits on expression and, consequently, perceived overlap is less likely.174
169

See Demers, supra note 164, at 309 (“A sound-alike is a recording intended
to resemble other recorded works, usually popular hits.”).
170
Cronin, supra note 13, at 1230.
171
From a psychological and philosophical perspective, the concept of artistic
originality in general is a thin one. It inaccurately frames creative works as spontaneous generations independent of the cultural context of their creation. Musicians have always been comfortable with this fact and foster a culture of appropriation. The study of music itself is rooted in reference to past works: jazz musicians learn their craft through improvising alterations to canonic standard progressions; and musicians of the classical era were known for re-orchestrating the
works of their contemporaries, adding to the free flowing creative dialogue of the
time. See Swed, supra note 12.
172
The human ear finds a finite number of tones, intervals, and rhythmic devices pleasing to the ear. More than many other kinds of art, the vocabulary of
music can be defined in measurable, quantitative values. The relationships between melodies, rhythms, and harmonies can all be expressed in terms of frequency, measureable time, and ratio-based intervals. The overwhelming majority
of composed music subscribes to this fundamentally limited set of accepted sonic
devices and standard structures. This is particularly true in the arena of popular
music where the authorial objective is listen-ability as opposed to high-art music,
such as John Cage for example where the objective in many instances is artistic
exploration. See Tony Phillips, The mathematics of piano tuning: Natural harmony, AM. MATHEMATICAL SOC’Y, http://www.ams.org/samplings/feature-column/fcarc-piano1. For other articles on the subject, see Mathematics of Music,
AM. MATHEMATICAL SOC’Y, http://www.ams.org/samplings/math-and-music#articles.
173
See Cronin, supra note 13, at 1230.
174
For example, compared to the color pallet of visual art, the accepted tonal
pallet for musical expression is limited. The color “red” is a spectral condition
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As an example of recent incidental copying, rights-holders to
Tom Petty’s classic “I Won’t Back Down” accused Sam Smith of
plagiarizing the song in his Number 1 hit “Stay With Me.”175 As in
the Ronson dispute, similarity between the two songs is minimal and
centers around a slight melodic and rhythmic similarity. 176 Tom
Petty himself admitted that the similarity was a “musical accident,”
but like Ronson, rather than risk an expensive and unpredictable dispute, Smith and his team settled with the publisher.177
This high probability of similarity is clearly problematic in genres where similarity between works is actually a valued compositional device. Modern electronic dance music like techno, electro,
and house is made intending for the individual recordings to be
seamlessly strung together into long format DJ sets.178 As a result,
these works are generally arrangements of common sonic devices
used in the genre179 but receive protection under the Metcalf doc-

encompassing a diverse range of electromagnetic wavelengths all of which constitute “red” but in different shades. ElectroMagnetic Color, COLOR MATTERS
https://www.colormatters.com/color-and-science/electromagnetic-color (last visited Sept. 24, 2016). Musical compositions, on the other hand, are generally constructed from a set of twelve notes, each of which has a precise quantitative definition known as “equal temperament.” For example, a perfectly tuned Middle C
has an accepted frequency of 262 Hz (when rounding up), and deviations from
these standards are rare, particularly in popular music. J. BACKUS, THE
ACOUSTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MUSIC 153 (1977), available at http://www.audio
logy.org/sites/default/files/ChasinConversionChart.pdf; Tony Phillips, The Mathematics of Piano Tuning: Frequencies and Notes, AM. MATHEMATICAL SOC’Y,
http://www.ams.org/samplings/feature-column/fcarc-piano2.
175
Daniel Kreps, Sam Smith on Tom Petty Settlement: ‘Similarities’ but ‘Complete Coincidence’, ROLLING STONE (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.rollingstone.
com/music/news/sam-smith--tom-petty-settlement-20150126.
176
Id.
177
Id. According to Petty, the parties resolved the issue amicably, and his publishers never threatened litigation during the negotiation. However, the quick
jump to settlement clearly indicates a greater skittishness in the shadow of potential litigation. Daniel Kreps, Tom Petty on Sam Smith Settlement: ‘No Hard Feelings. These Things Happen’, ROLLING STONE (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.rolling
stone.com/music/news/tom-petty-on-sam-smith-settlement-no-hard-feelingsthese-things-happen-20150129.
178
For a discussion on the history of DJ’ing, see BUTLER, supra note 91, at
37.
179
See id. at 206–09.
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trine. While works of Beethoven and Bach were detailed and complex, these dance songs may only contain a standard four-to-thefloor rhythm, a simple melody, and textural or atmospheric sonic
components.180 Under the current copyright standards, these songs
are almost certainly infringing on works by pioneers of the genre
like Frankie Knuckles and Giorgio Moroder, but it is unlikely an
electronic musician would actually assert this to be the case.
For all of these reasons, broad infringement standards restrict
creativity in music and improperly punish artists for using traditional composition techniques. The lines between influence and infringement are far too distorted as to be effectively applicable to a
modern music culture that heavily values referential and appropriative works. The threat of litigation prevents artists from expressing
the context of their creative influence and limits an already confined
medium of expression. These issues reflect the problems in applying
modern copyright infringement doctrine to music and the inequitable policy implications of current standards to which the judiciary
should react.
B. Shooting Themselves in the Foot: Impact on the Industry
Like musicians, industry commentators have lamented the
overly broad application of substantial similarity standards to music
compositions and criticized it for encouraging an already too common practice of using infringement disputes as a profit opportunity.181 Erratic jury decisions invite weaker infringement claims
brought by plaintiffs with little to lose, particularly when compensating counsel through contingency fees.182 As noted, this lack of
predictability also encourages defendants to settle earlier in the process for fear that they might lose much more at trial; those who do
not settle could face a capricious and ill-informed jury.183
Because of the industry’s uncertain position as a whole, the opportunity to profit from infringement disputes is a tempting venture
when seeking to diversify revenue streams. While historically many
music infringement plaintiffs were amateur songwriters seeking to
180
181

See id.
See Cronin, supra note 13, at 1192–93; Siy, supra note 13; Wu, supra note

16.
182
183

See Cronin, supra note 13, at 1192–93, 1243–44.
See id. at 1188, 1243–44.
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capitalize on the success of another artist, publishing houses and record labels are more frequently parties to these disputes than in the
past.184 Despite infringement profiteering’s apparent adoption by
some as a component of their profit schemes, the practice corrodes
industry sustainability overall.
In an industry plagued by uncertainty, increased liability potential is an unwelcomed addition to the already high risks associated
with investing in new works. In the shadow of infringement potential, music publishers and record labels, like movie studios, might
concertedly reject unsolicited submissions to avoid accidental exposure to infringement claims.185 Any new potential rights acquisitions
will have to be vetted through a comprehensive research process to
identify any potential liability associated with the work.186 These
necessary expenses will add more entry barriers to the already exclusive industry and thin the margins on new acquisitions.187 The
fear of liability and increased costs associated with its avoidance
will almost certainly chill investment in new music, potentially depriving innovative artists of funding and capital.
Furthermore, rights-holders might choose to monetize culturally
relevant works through litigation once the primary market for the
work has cooled. These rights-holders, whether they be publishers,
labels, sample trolls, or individuals, have less incentive to create,
distribute, or invest in new works of music than to generate profit
from current holdings. Evidence suggests that some entities already
take advantage of this approach by suing for unauthorized sampling
of classic works just before the statute of limitations has expired on

184

For example, see Sections IV. A. & B., generally discussing infringement
suits brought by a UK music publisher, rights-holders to a Tom Petty song, and
hip-hop producer DJ Mustard.
185
See Cronin, supra note 13, at 1244. Access to a work alone can be damning
in cases where the works in question are substantially but only incidentally similar.
186
Id. There is already technology that searches through music catalogues to
identify unauthorized samples even when they have been extensively obscured in
the recording. Duncan Geere, IPhone App Scans Your Music Collection, Identifies
All The Samples, WIRED (June 19, 2012, 6:15 PM) https://www.wired.com/
2012/06/whosampled-app/. A similar approach could be taken to finding soundalikes.
187
See Cronin, supra note 13, at 1188.
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the claim.188 In light of the “Blurred Lines” decision, these opportunistic litigants might be tempted to exploit profits from substantial
similarity claims as well.
The new—and quite valuable—market189 for electronic music is
particularly vulnerable to the implications of this trend. Artists like
Skrillex and Diplo are globally relevant due to their characteristic
production styles that alone have spawned new distinct genres.190 It
seems that in light of the “Blurred Lines” decision, these distinctive
stylistic qualities are protected expressive material under the Ninth
Circuit’s approach,191 and a wave of litigation surrounding these
new genres could have a potentially massive impact on these markets.
The industry is already reacting to the potential infringement liability in “ripping off” another artist’s style, and some suggest the
“Blurred Lines” decision is to blame.192 In a truly bizarre situation,
hip-hop producer DJ Mustard claimed that “Fancy” by Iggy Azalea
and “Classic Man” by Jidenna were rip-offs of his signature production style that has dominated West Coast hip-hop for the last few
years.193 It is quite obvious that both songs are heavily influenced
by Mustard, and both beats sound like his productions.194 But even
though Mustard was the originator, he received no credit on either
song.195 Instead, Jidenna’s publishers gave co-songwriting credits to
188

See Sternburg, supra note 50; see also Wu supra note 16.
Glenn Peoples, Global EDM Market Hits $6.9 Billion, BILLBOARD (May
22, 2015), http://www.billboard.com/articles/business/6575901/global-edm-market-hits-69-billion.
190
Gigen Mammoser, We Talked to a Lawyer About How the “Blurred Lines”
Verdict Will Impact Copyright Law in Dance Music, THUMP (Oct. 15, 2015, 11:31
AM),
https://thump.vice.com/en_us/article/we-talked-to-a-lawyer-about-howthe-blurred-lines-verdict-will-impact-copyright-law-in-dance-music.
191
Id.
192
See Tom Breihan, DJ Mustard Thinks “Fancy” And “Classic Man”
Ripped Him Off, Which, Duh, STEREOGUM (Aug. 19, 2015, 10:34 AM),
http://www.stereogum.com/1825100/dj-mustard-thinks-fancy-and-classic-manripped-him-off-which-duh/wheres-the-beef/; Andrew Unterberger, Janelle Monae on Iggy Azalea Controversy: ‘She Steal From Us, We Steal Back’, SPIN (Aug.
15 2015), http://www.spin.com/2015/08/janelle-monae-jidenna-iggy-azalea-classic-man-steal-fancy/; Christman, supra note 165.
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Breihan, supra note 192.
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Id.
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Id.
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Iggy Azalea and her collaborators to avoid an infringement dispute
when both had clearly copied Mustard.196 Jidenna said in an interview that his team’s decision to give Azalea and her collaborators
writing credit on “Classic Man” was to avoid a “Blurred Lines” type
litigation.197
Unless there is a major change to the current substantial similarity framework, these increasingly ridiculous disputes will only become more common. By using infringement claims as a new lowrisk-high-reward revenue stream, the industry is thinning its already
narrow margins and fueling apprehension in new music investment.
In an industry built on creativity and innovation, the potential
chilling effects of this practice on new music investment could have
far reaching implications on the industry’s sustainability. Broad
standards and unpredictable decisions only make infringement monetization a more alluring revenue opportunity for industry participants, and the need for short-term profits may outweigh the desire
to avoid the strategy’s long term effects.
Not only is modern substantial similarity doctrine inconsistent
with historical precedent, but it also runs contrary to the constitutional goals of copyright.198 By not addressing these issues, courts
are doing more to stifle innovation than promote it. The scope of
copyright protection has expanded immensely since its inception,
and the creative industries are worse off for it. In light of these policy
and economic implications, the Court should overhaul judicial approaches to substantial similarity claims.
V. POSSIBLE LEGAL SOLUTIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
The destructive implications of current substantial similarity
tests are by no means exclusive concerns of the music industry, and
all creative industries are potentially at risk for damaging waves of
attenuated infringement litigation.199 By stretching already imprecise tests to cover all copyrightable media, the current framework
fails to address the particular creative and industrial needs of each
196

Id.
Unterberger, supra note 192.
198
“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” Congress may grant
authors “the exclusive Right to their respective” works. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8.
199
See generally Williams, supra note 14.
197
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sector.200 While some music law critics suggest solutions primarily
focused on the system’s application to music, this Note offers a comprehensive solution that would hopefully help addresses the needs
of all creative industries. To truly fix music copyright, copyright in
general should change.
Commentators have suggested a plethora of potential legal solutions to the problems in the modern substantial similarity framework.201 Even though the Ninth Circuit’s extrinsic–intrinsic test is
an influential—and regrettably problematic—approach, similar issues are common in doctrines across all the circuits.202 Three common categories of proposals have persisted over time, each addressing different perceived issues in the system.203 The following section
evaluates these proposed solutions and their effects on music law,
concluding that a blended system utilizing helpful elements from
each is the most promising approach. Many of the suggestions discussed below were proposed as alternatives to the extrinsic–intrinsic
tests, while others address the broader issues in substantial similarity
schemes across all circuits.
A. Change the Standards and Tests
Critics of modern substantial similarity standards often suggest
a major change to the fundamental judicial tests.204 It is undeniable
that current tests are confusing to jurors and produce unpredictable

200

(a) Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression . . . Works of authorship include the following categories: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying
words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes
and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion
pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural
works.
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). Software is also protected, but through analogy as a literary work.
201
See Eric Rogers, Substantially Unfair: An Empirical Examination of Copyright Substantial Similarity Analysis Among the Federal Circuits, 2013 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 893, 915 (2013); Roodhuyzen, supra note 120, at 1412–18.
202
See Rogers, supra note 201, at 895.
203
See id. at 915.
204
See Roodhuyzen, supra note 120, at 1412–18.
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and sometimes inequitable results.205 To modernize the current infringement regime, courts will almost certainly need to update their
tests and standards. Opinions differ, however, on what form these
changes should take; some recommend alterations to the current
framework, while others suggest eliminating the tests entirely.206
For example, Michael Sharb has proposed a five-step modified
“total concept and feel” analysis, while Lawrence Sher has suggested a four-step alternative to the system.207 In his review of the
Ninth Circuit’s extrinsic–intrinsic system, Montgomery Frankel
suggests that the court adopt a single-prong analysis that simply
asks: “Did defendant copy plaintiff’s protected expression?”208 He
claims that similarities in “total concept and feel” are completely
irrelevant if the defendant did not copy the plaintiff’s protected expression.209 Additionally, he believes that juries should be instructed
to objectively evaluate the works but have the autonomy to weigh
all relevant factors as they see fit.210
Those who recommend eliminating tests altogether believe
courts should revert to copyright’s constitutional purpose—promotion of the useful arts and sciences.211 According to these critics,
courts should, instead of applying convoluted comparison tests,
simply determine whether judgment for the plaintiff would further
constitutional policy goals and legislative intent. 212 Application of
these principles should, in theory, lead to more equitable decisions
and limit the scope of copyright as to promote innovation. However
alluring this approach, empirical data shows that without a defined
test, decisions are far less predictable and more likely to be reversed

205

Id.
Id.
207
Both proposals separate the question of idea and expression as to clearly
distinguish between the protectable and un-protectable elements. Michael L.
Sharb, Getting a “Total Concept and Feel” of Copyright Infringement, 64 U.
COLO. L. REV. 903, 920 (1993); Lawrence Jeffrey Sher, The Search for a Suitable
Standard of Substantial Similarity, The Ninth Circuit’s Application of the Krofft
Test, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 229, 257–61 (1991).
208
Frankel, supra note 120, at 454–57
209
Id.
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Id.
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Rogers, supra note 201, at 915–16; Roodhuyzen, supra note 120, at 1412.
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Roodhuyzen, supra note 120, at 1419.
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on appeal.213 Eliminating tests entirely would exacerbate the inefficacies its proponents seek to resolve.214
While updating judicial tests is clearly a necessary step to fixing
the substantial similarity system, changes to the frameworks alone
would not solve other pervasive issues in the regime. In general,
flexible standards meant to cover all media of copyrightable works
fall short in that they fail to address the unique needs of each creative
arena. Furthermore, these blanket standards fall behind the times
and are quickly rendered obsolete in light of morphing creative landscapes. In the modern era, creative cultures evolve far quicker than
legal frameworks, leaving them inapplicable to the industries they
seek to regulate. As discussed above, application of these overarching tests to music compositions often produces decisions that are
bizarrely out of touch with modern songwriting culture. The kind of
creative work being evaluated in a dispute has a substantial effect
on the case’s outcome, and switching one broad principle for another fails to address these important issues.215
B. Juries and Experts
Detractors frequently critique the pervasive adoption of the “lay
listener” and “intended audience” tests by many circuits.216 Clearly,
lay juries are ill-qualified to evaluate the creative works in question—that is in fact what makes them lay juries. These critics believe
that juries composed of those already familiar with the expressive
medium would make more consistent and equitable decisions when
applying the current framework.217 Other commentators claim that
admitting expert testimony on all aspects of infringement disputes
would solve many problems with the lay listener tests.218 Experts

213

The Eleventh Circuit is the only court that has yet to expound a defined test
for substantial similarity. In his empirical study on the matter, Eric Rogers found
that Eleventh Circuit decisions were less predictable and more likely to be reversed than the other Circuits. Rogers, supra note 201, at 921, 925.
214
See id.
215
Id. at 926–27.
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See, e.g., Lund, supra note 79, at 63–65.
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Id.
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Rogers, supra note 201, at 917–18.
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would clarify how the operative test applies to the medium in question and do their best to educate jurors on esoteric aspects of the
evaluation.219
In her article Fixing Music Copyright, Jamie Lund argues that
the “intended audience” for musical compositions are in fact musicians who are fluent in written music rather than the general public.220 Her studies showed that lay listeners were substantially less
accurate than versed musicians in their evaluation of musical similarities and that exposure to expert testimony did little to improve
their abilities.221 Similarly, in his empirical study on the subject, Eric
Rogers found that allowance of expert testimony had minimal effect
on substantial similarity decisions across the circuits in general.222
He concluded that expert testimony either fails to properly inform
juries, or jurors effectively disregard expert evidence. 223 Under either condition, allowance of expert testimony alone is not properly
effective.224
However, it is sensible to believe that a jury composed of those
versed in the particular media in question would likely return more
accurate and predictable decisions. Changes to jury composition has
a substantial impact on the accuracy of music infringement analysis,
suggesting that the lay listener test is fundamentally flawed.225 However, it would not be practical to call juries composed only of artists
in the medium. Additionally, without changing the underlying tests,
experts and educated jurors are still mired in the same convoluted
standards applied today.226 As evidenced by the expert testimony in
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Id.
In her opinion, written musical notation—i.e. compositions—are intended
for the musically literate audience. Lund, supra note 79, at 63.
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Id. at 86–88.
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Rogers, supra note 201, at 928–29.
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See Lund, supra note 79, at 86–88
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See, e.g., Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13–06004 JAK
(AGRx), 2014 WL 7877773, at *12–17 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2014).
220

2016]

EXCLUSIVE GROOVE

275

Williams, imprecise underlying judicial standards can lead even experts to improper analytical conclusions.227 Outcomes might generally be more informed, but the issue of overall consistency and predictability remains.
C. One Court
Another common recommendation is vesting jurisdiction for
copyright claims in one appellate court.228 Doing so would eliminate
the patchwork of tests applied across the circuits, leading to more
predictable outcomes and discouraging forum shopping.229 With exclusive jurisdiction over copyright disputes, the court would gain
familiarity with the subject matter and develop clearer standards
from a more experienced perspective.230 Empirical data supports
this position231 as choice of law has a substantial impact on the outcome of infringement disputes, and centralizing judicial jurisdiction
might resolve this inconsistency.232
This suggestion is quite alluring to those who believe that many
of copyright’s ills arise from the court’s inexperience with the cultures and industries of the creative media they review. By centralizing jurisdiction, the new appeals court could focus on developing
more coherent tests and clarify their application to the varying mediums of copyrightable expression. As copyrights become increasingly valuable assets in the modern economy, law surrounding their
infringement may require more devoted judicial attention than the
varying circuits can provide.
However, this proposal is not without its pitfalls. Many criticize
Congress’ decision to centralize the patent appeals system, claiming
that the Federal Circuit has done more to obfuscate the law than
clarify it.233 For example, in 2014 the Supreme Court heard six appeals from the Federal Circuit—the most ever—and reversed five of
227
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those decisions.234 This seems to indicate that a centralized copyright court could fall victim to the same issues as circuit courts, and
inconsistency might just be replaced by consistently wrong decisions.
D. This Author’s Suggestion: A Blended Solution
The difficulty in developing a system for comprehensive substantial similarity reform is that any effective proposal will have to
be multifaceted. Isolated changes to the framework would only address isolated issues, and as it stands, the problems in substantial
similarity law vary across a number of different doctrines. Even
more challenging is determining how these changes should be implemented; inconsistency across the circuits begs an overarching solution.
Heading patent’s warning, the copyright community should be
wary of centralizing its appellate process. It would be more appropriate for the Supreme Court to resolve these issues by granting certiorari to a group of substantial similarity claims covering a variety
of media—“The Copyright Cases.” The Court could take this opportunity to articulate clear and appropriate jurisprudence for substantial similarity cases while still allowing for interpretative innovation
between the circuits. With input from the respective creative industries, the Court could expound doctrines that are more in line with
modern creative cultures and industries. Blended from the proposals
of other commentators, this Note provides four suggestions that
might inform this restructuring.
First, and most importantly, the Court should no longer utilize
the substantial similarity doctrine and instead apply a gross similarity standard. In this context “gross similarity” would mean: inexcusable similarity on almost all factors and criteria. This may seem like
a drastic proposal, but it would be quite consistent with modern creative culture. Because substantial similarity between works will inevitably arise given the staggering rate of current creative output, a
gross similarity standard properly reflects the narrow scope of protection that should be extended to these less rarified works. This is
not to say that plaintiffs would be limited to actions against reproduction of their work in total. Rights-holders could still bring suit
234

Id.
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for unlicensed appropriation of major, significant portions of their
work but could no longer base claims on such attenuated differences
as are allowable today.
Second, there should be no subjective considerations in determining infringement, and all observations should be made from an
objective standpoint. This would bring copyright decisions in line
with other areas of the law which generally require objective fact
finding. Objective tests would hopefully lead to more predictable
outcomes and assuage some of the mounting anxiety surrounding
these disputes that leads to preemptive settlements. Allowing jurors
to consider their own subjective opinions leaves too much opportunity for misapplication of the law and capricious decisions. On
appeal, defendants have almost no grounds to challenge subjective
findings, and judges almost always uphold the jury decision.
Third, expert testimony and extrinsic evidence should be allowed on all factual matters at issue. Even though expert input seems
to have little impact on jury decisions in these cases so far, their
testimonies may carry more weight when applied during purely objective analysis. By allowing experts to clarify the application of
tests to the media under review, jury decisions might better conform
to the cultural understandings and creative needs of that industry.
Calling juries composed entirely of artists is not a practical suggestion, but lay juries should be able to consider their opinions. A viable
approach might be to allow for survey results from a statistically
sampled group of those familiar with the relevant medium of expression. Juries could consider these surveys as a factor in their determination, but they would not have to be outcome determinative.
Fourth, courts should apply different tests for different categories of media. A fundamental issue with current substantial similarity tests is that they are not easily applied across all mediums of copyrightable expression. But, it would be impractical for the court to
expound eight different tests and clarify the application of each to
their respective mediums. Instead, the court should identify categories of copyrightable expression that are similar enough in their creative features that one test could suffice. Each category would center
around the most important authorial features of each medium and be
paired with the most appropriate test for analyzing those features.
Consider for example these categories and their respective tests:
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1. Literary, Dramatic, and Narrative Works: Abstractions Test235
2. Software and Technology Literature: Extrinsic
Filtration Analysis 236
3. Visual Arts, Sculpture, and Architecture: Total
Concept and Feel 237
4. Music, Choreography, and Performance Art: Analytical Dissection 238
It is true that at times these categories would overlap when applied to certain works as the case would be for video games. Under
these circumstances, the court would consider the narrative features
of the work under an abstractions test, the visual components under
total concept and feel, and the software component under a filtration
test. Facially this may come across as cumbersome, but it is actually
a clearer system for jurors to follow.
Separating analysis on these factors would give jurors a more
nuanced understanding of the works at issue, hopefully leading to
more accurate decisions. This would also depend on what expressive
components are actually at issue in the dispute. For example, if a
plaintiff were to accuse a defendant of infringing on the plaintiff’s
protected original melody, the jury would only consider evidence of
similarity as to that specific feature rather than the works as a whole.
Total concept and feel when applied to protected arrangements overexpands the probative value of that expressive feature and may even
trivialize similarities that alone could rise to level of infringement.
235

For literary and narrative works, the question would become: how far must
we abstract these two works before they become grossly similar, and is that level
of abstraction objectively reasonable?
236
When analyzing software literature, the jury would use the merger and
scénes á faire doctrines to filter out un-protectable elements and consider the remaining portions for gross similarity, weighing isolated analysis and comparison
in total equally.
237
For visual works, the jury would consider the total concept and feel of the
protectable expressions using merger and scénes á faire to limit its application.
238
Music would only be analyzed in dissection and not in totality. The jury
would have the autonomy to weigh each dissected observation equally. The expressive components in arrangement would be only one factor in the consideration
and would be weighed against all other available evidence.
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This system would limit the scope of copyright allotted to protected works based on the type of authorship they exercise, recognizing the distinct creative needs of each media. When drafting these
tests, the court should consider input from those versed in each category and tailor instructions as to fit the cultural and industrial understandings of each. Hopefully when combined with an objective
gross similarity standard and extrinsic evidence, these categorizations would properly guide juries through their analysis, producing
more equitable and predictable decisions.
CONCLUSION
It has become abundantly clear that the U.S. copyright regime is
in dire need of fundamental restructuring, and Congress seems
poised to comprehensively reevaluate the Copyright Act for the first
time since 1976 in the near future.239 Even though creatives will
warmly welcome this long awaited reform, legislators are unlikely
to address issues in the substantial similarity system. Even though
the music industry is profoundly injured by the current framework,
it is not remotely an industry exclusive issue. All creative industries
have evolved in recent years, and the law has failed to catch up. In
light of this reality, courts, creatives, and industry-people alike must
take responsibility for the distressing condition of modern copyright
and work towards sustainable solutions attainable without Congressional action.
First, all circuits should reexamine their current approach to infringement claims in great detail and—hopefully with the guidance
of experts—work to develop clearer tests that reflect the modern
creative climate. Because of their influential position in the copyright arena, the Second and Ninth Circuits should lead this reformation and outline clear precedents that address the fundamental issues of substantial similarity doctrine. Furthermore, courts should
seriously consider eliminating the substantial similarity doctrine in
favor of a gross similarity standard to bring the scope of copyright
in line with decreasing creative rarity.
Additionally, creatives and industry entities need to take responsibility for the self-destructive trend of monetizing infringement litigation potential. The music industry is particularly guilty of this
239
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practice and exacerbates its own woes by doing so. Musicians, record labels, publishers, and rights-holders need to commit themselves
to a fundamental cultural change or risk destroying themselves from
the inside. By continuously exploiting one another through attenuated infringement claims, industry players are only raising barriers
to entry and adding more uncertainty to their already precarious investment market. To that same end, artists and industry entities do
themselves more harm than good by grabbing at songwriter credits
and forcing inequitable settlements. These disputes limit the scope
of permissive creative influence and turn traditionally acceptable
composition techniques into theft. In an industry centered on creative innovation, business practices that chill that innovation may
have long-term negative implications that greatly outweigh the opportunity for short-term profit.

